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In the weekend’s presidential election in the Czech Republic, voters chose Miloš Zeman to
succeed Václav Havel and Václav Klaus as the first directly elected President in the
country’s history. A former prime minister for the left, he defeated the current foreign
minister Karel Schwarzenberg (centre-right) in the second round of the elections on
Saturday. David Cadier considers the potential policy implications of the result, arguing that
despite Zeman’s previous pro-Europe rhetoric, a major policy shift away from the country’s
cautious approach towards the EU seems unlikely in the short term. 
The f irst major outcome of  the presidential election in the Czech Republic this past weekend concerns
the incumbent who is leaving of f ice. A f ierce polit ician, skillf ul in behind-the-scenes strings-pulling and in
go- it-alone sorties, it would be an understatement to say that Václav Klaus has been a vocal and
inf luential President. His most f erocious battle has notoriously been waged against European
integration. He has partly imprinted his views on the ODS, a conservative party he had created in the
early 1990s but has since lef t. In f act, under the current ODS-led government, the Czech Republic has
been one of  the most hostile member states towards f urther budgetary or polit ical integration, opting
out along with the UK f rom the European Stability Mechanism in 2009.
Will the outcome of  the presidential elections bring about a change in the Czech Republic’s EU policies?
Answering this question means extrapolating President-elect Miloš Zeman’s pref erences but also
ref lecting on the actual inf luence that Presidents have in Czech f oreign policy. While the media were
prompt to label Zeman as pro-European, and while he might indeed contribute to altering the rhetoric, a
sharp policy turn appears unlikely.
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Miloš Zeman is undeniably a more enthusiastic supporter of
European integration than Václav Klaus. During the campaign he
vowed to bring the country back to the EU mainstream and
declared himself  in support of  the adoption of  the euro. At the
same time, looking at Mr Zeman’s polit ical record means that his
words should be taken with caution. As a matter of  f act, he has
sought to retain some room f or manoeuvre on the European
question. While he naturally leans towards the pro-European
ČSSD – a party he turned into a major polit ical f orce in the
1990s– he also reached out during the campaign to the anti-
European Communist Party. He called f or the establishment of
a European f ederation in the long run, but rejected the idea of  a
European ‘super-state’. When announcing his intention to f ly
the EU f lag on top of  Prague castle – a symbolic move as his
predecessor adamantly ref used to do so – he evoked the hope
to receive, in return, subsidies f or the Danube-Oder-Elbe water
corridor.
Another aspect of  the last f ew weeks invites caution in
anticipating the course of  Zeman’s presidency: namely the
support he received f rom Václav Klaus. The two polit icians were
arch-rivals in the 1990s, each representing the poles of  a deep
lef t- right ideological divide. Nevertheless, Klaus backed Miloš
Zeman’s bid very early in the campaign, implicit ly at f irst but then
heavily crit icising Karel Schwarzenberg’s comments on the Beneš decrees between the two rounds. Miloš
Zeman f ollowed suit in these attacks even though he had acquiesced in the past to the views expressed
by Karel Schwarzenberg. While having markedly dif f erent views on the EU, Zeman and Klaus do share
certain views in f oreign af f airs; both f or instance opposed the recognition of  Kosovo’s independence
and put the blame on Georgia f or the South Ossetia conf lict of  2008. But more than common posit ions,
what they may both have as President is a similar posture: independent and interventionist, of ten
provocative and at t imes leaning towards populism, one that renders them rather unpredictable.
The question then is to what extent style might af f ect substance. Here it is important to recognise that
in the Czech polit ical system the government has the largest responsibility over f oreign policy, with
presidential powers being limited in this area. The late Václav Havel – who sealed the reconciliation with
Germany in 1997, against public opinion, and signed the ‘letter of  the 8’ supporting the 2003 Iraq war, in
spite of  his government – was in that (and other matters) an exception. Václav Klaus has been less
powerf ul: he delayed, but did not manage to prevent the adoption of  the Lisbon Treaty. Nor did he have
an impact on the Czech Republic’s of f icial stance on Kosovo or Georgia. If  not powerf ul, there are
nevertheless three ways by which Czech Presidents can be inf luential.
First, the President has ratif ication powers and theref ore the ability to inf luence the adoption of  EU
treaties (his veto however can be overruled by a vote in the lower-house). We can expect f ewer
instances of  blockage on the part of  President Zeman in this regard, but the adoption capacity remains
with the government. Second, the Constitution states that the President is to represent the country
abroad. Václav Klaus has not hesitated to use this prerogative to promote his own ideas, meeting with
f ellow Eurosceptic f igures and presenting at overseas conf erences to promote his book ref uting the
theories of  climate change. It is dif f icult to predict whether President Zeman will be more parsimonious in
his state visits, but what we can maybe expect is some gestures of  rapprochement towards Russia.
Third, and most importantly, Presidents can be inf luential on f oreign policy if  they have leverage over
domestic polit ics. They have a role of  ult imate arbitrator when the party system f ails to produce a
governing coalit ion or when one collapses. Miloš Zeman might f avor the ČSSD in such a conf iguration.
By retaining a certain clout inside major polit ical parties, the President may sometimes directly inf luence
f oreign policy discourses. The most telling recent example was Prime Minister Necas’ attempt, in the f ace
of  intra-party contestation in the ODS, to reach out to Klaus’ ideas by overtly dismissing the diplomatic
tradit ion of  support f or Human Rights activists abroad, which has been one of  the main pillars of  Czech
f oreign policy since 1989. Petr Necas and the next ODS leader will still need to reach out to Klaus in the
f uture.
This later point on domestic polit ics adds to the argument that a sharp U-turn in Czech EU policies is not
to be expected in the short- term. Some of  the underlying causes of  the Czech Republic’s cautious
approach towards European integration will not evaporate with the departure of  Klaus. Af ter all, if  the
current government does not f eel compelled to set a date f or the adoption of  the euro – to which
Prague is bound by the Accession Treaty – it is because Czech public opinion remains opposed to it.
Most importantly, Václav Klaus himself  will not disappear; he will leave of f ice but certainly not the sphere
of  public debate. He announced his intention to devote time to his think tank, the Centre f or Economics
and Polit ics. But some wonder whether, with the ODS candidate collapsing in the f irst round, Klaus’
attacks on Schwarzenberg bef ore the second-round could be a way to prepare the ground f or his return
as the savior of  the Czech right.
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